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ARGUMENT
1. The occurrence of an industrial accident and injury was before the Industrial
Commission.

UPS clearly disputed the occurrence of an industrial accident and injury from the outset
of litigation. The definition of an injury under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law requires
that it be caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of" employment. LC. § 72102(18)(a). It follows that to dispute whether an accident and injury arose out of a worker's
employment includes a dispute of the occurrence of an accident and injury as defined in Idaho
Code § 72-102(18).
The pleadings in this matter show that UPS disputed the oceurrence of an accident and
injury. In UPS's Answer to Complaint filed on March 29, 2010, it denied Respondent's alleged
accident actually occurred on or about the time claimed and denied the condition for which he
sought benefits was caused partly or entirely by an accident arising out of and in the course of
Respondent's employment. (R. Vol. I, p. 6). UPS denied all allegations of the Complaint not
admitted in the Answer and explicitly stated "Defendants dispute that [Respondent's] condition
resulted from an aecident arising out of his employment as a UPS driver." (R. Vol. I, p. 7).
In UPS's response to Respondent's request for calendaring it stated "The primary dispute
in this case is whether Respondent's bending over to
out of employment as a UPS driver." (R. Vol. I, p. 12).

his shoe constitutes an accident arising
UPS's post-hearing brief, it asserted

Respondent had "failed to prove his injury was the result of an accident arising out of his
employment" and discussed the issue at length.
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2010 Brief,

12-20).

Industrial

Commission's 2010 Notice of Hearing shows that UPS disputed the occurrence of an accident
and injury.

(R. Vol. I, p. 18).

In the Notice, the first two issues listed are 1) Whether

Respondent suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and 2)
Whether Respondent's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. (R. Vol. I, p. 18). Both parties confirmed at the outset of the 2010 hearing that
these issues were in dispute, and the Referee referred to them collectively as "a major issue in the
case." (2010 Hearing Tr., p. 4 at 20). Although the Industrial Commission rephrased these
issues sua sponte in its 2010 Decision to include only an injury arising out of Respondent's
employment, UPS did not concede any of the disputed issues previously identified.
Given the course of proceedings, it is apparent UPS contested the occurrence of an
accident and injury within the meaning of the statute, and absent a formal stipulation to that
effect, the burden of proving each of the elements of a compensable claim remained with
Respondent. Gomez v. Dura lvfark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 272 P.3d 569, 573 (2012). In
Gomez, the Court stated it wished to provide a clear message that "[C]laimant's attorneys should
no longer be lulled by anything other than a stipulation to all legal prerequisites and elements for
recovery .... " Id. at 599, 571. Essentially, unless a party formally stipulates to concede an
issue, the party with the burden of proof is not relieved of its duty to establish a prima facie case.
In his brief, Respondent fails to discuss the pleadings, 2010 Notice of Hearing, or the
discussion between the parties and the Referee at the outset of the 2010 hearing. Instead,
asse1is

not dispute an industrial accident and injury based on two letters; a 20 I 0 Notice

of Claim status letter in which UPS denied his claim, and a subsequent letter sent
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months

later to the same effect. (Resp. Brief, pp. 23-24). His contention these letters are substantial and
competent evidence to support the Industrial Commission's finding UPS "never disputed" both
issues is unconvincing. (Resp. Brief, p. 24). In the Notice of Claim Status Letter, the third party
administrator (TP A) stated Respondent's claim was denied because his injury did not arise out of
his employment. (Resp. 2010 Ex. 8, p. 8001 ). In the subsequent letter, the TP A asserted "The
act of bending over and tying a shoe did not arise out of [Respondent's] employment with UPS."
(Resp. 2010 Ex. 9, p. 9006).

These letters plainly show UPS disagreed with Respondent's

assertion he had sustained a compensable injury, and nowhere in them did UPS concede the
occurrence of an industrial accident and injury or waive its right to deny the same. Furthermore,
nothing contained in the letters eliminated Respondent's burden of proving the elements of his
claim.
UPS did not concede the occurrence of an accident and injury as defined in Idaho Code §
72-102 (18), and the Industrial Commission's assertion to the contrary went to the foundation of
the case. Accordingly, its finding that Respondent sustained an accident and injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment should be reversed.
2. The Industrial Commission's ruling that UPS effectively rebutted the premises
presumption should be upheld.
UPS overcame the presumption that Respondent's injury arose out of and in the course of

his employment by presenting substantial and competent evidence the conditions of his
employment did not contribute to his injury.
mJury, a

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF, P. 3

It is well-established in Idaho that to prove a

it was caused by an accident arising out of

course of his employment. LC. 72-102(18)(a). An injury is deemed to be in the course of
employment when it takes place while the worker is doing the duty which he is employed to
perform. Kiger v. Idaho Corp., 85 Idaho 424, 430, 380 P.2d 208, 210 (1963). It is considered to
arise out of the employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Id.
The premises presumption is the principle that when an injury occurs on the employer's
premises, there is a presumption it arose out of and in the course of employment. Kessler v.
Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P.2d 28, 32 (1997). Although the Court has previously

recognized the presumption, "the mere fact that an injury occurs on the employer's premises is
not an exclusive test for compensability, but rather, is only one factor to be considered" and must
be accompanied by a showing of a causal connection between the conditions existing on the
employer's premises and the accident involved. Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133
Idaho 572, 575, 990 P.2d 738, 741 (1999). Simply because an injury occurs on the employer's
premises, "this fact in and of itself: is insufficient to establish that the accident arose out of and in
the course of . . . employment, absent a showing of causal connection between the conditions
existing on the employer's premises and the accident involved, it is a factor to be taken into
consideration." Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 350, 411 P.2d 763, 765 (1966).
In civil actions, Idaho Rule of Evidence 301 states that unless otherwise provided for by
statute, Idaho appellate decisions, or the Idaho Rules of Evidence,
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
go mg
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption,
not
sense
of nonpe.rsuasion,
to
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which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast. The burden of going forward is satisfied by the introduction of
evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to condude that the
presumed fact does not exist.... If the party meets the burden of going forward,
no instruction on the presumption shall be given, and the trier of fact shall
determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact without regard to
the presumption.
I.R.E. 301 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court will not disturb the Industrial Commission findings solely on the
basis of conflicting facts. Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 435, 974 P.2d 78, 81
(1999).
Here, UPS introduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption Respondent's injury
arose out of and in the course of his employment, including evidence that:
Respondent did not operate out of a UPS satellite facility; he was able to park
his work truck at Arnold Aviation because of his relationship with the Arnold
family. (2010 Trans., p. 63 at 1-15, 88 at 12-23).
UPS did not own, control, manage, maintain, or make repairs at Arnold
Aviation or its surrounding property. (2010 Trans., pp. 76 at 6-8, 78 at 21-25,
91 at 14-16).
UPS did not have a written agreement with Arnold Aviation to use its
facilities and did not pay rent. (2010 Trans., pp. 90 at 19-21, 91 at 3-6).
UPS did not have a separate or designated area within Arnold Aviation. (2010
Trans., p. 75 at 2-5).
Respondent's primary job duties included loading his truck with packages,
driving to various locations within his designated region, and delivering
packages. (2010 Trans., p. 17 at 14-19).
UPS did not pay Respondent to prepare for work (grooming, dressing, etc.).
(McGuire, pp. 26 at 1-8, 48 at 21-25, 49 at 1-25).
did not provide Respondent with
boots and did not require him to
wear lace-up boots or a particular brand of footwear. (McGuire, pp. 16 at 3-
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16, 40 at 24-25).
UPS did not require Respondent to change into his work clothes or work boots
at Arnold Aviation; Respondent was expected to begin his shift with his
shoelaces tied and prepared for the day. (McGuire, pp. 26 at 1-8, 37 at 11-19,
48 at 15-25, 49 at 1-25).
Respondent's injury occurred prior to starting his shift while waiting for his
truck to wam1 up, when he bent over to tie his shoelaces. Respondent was
sitting on a couch in the lobby at Arnold Aviation. (2010 Trans., p. 28 at 1825).
Respondent testified that he intentionally did not tie his shoelaces when he left
work that morning, and arrived at the satellite facility with his shoelaces
untied. (2010 Trans., p. 61 at 22-25).
Diagnostic studies from 1990 showed a herniation at L4-5, the same level as
the claimed injury. (App. Ex. 21, p. 235).
Respondent had four prior workers' compensation claims for low back injuries and
was diagnosed with chronic low back pain and current upper back pain less than five
months prior to his 2009 injury. (App. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2, 5 at 75-76).
UPS also presented case law from the Supreme Court of Virginia where the court denied
benefits to a UPS worker who injured his low back when he bent over to tie his shoelace while
unloading packages from his truck. (App. 2010

Brief~

pp. 16-17). The court found that although

the claimant's injury occurred in the course of his employment, it did not arise out of his
employment because "The situation of a loose shoelace confronting the claimant was wholly
independent of the master-servant relationship." United Parcel Serv. of America v. Fetterman,
336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (Va. 1985).
Respondent's argument the Industrial Commission committed legal error because it did
not apply the "Foust standard" is erroneous and ignores the plain language of I.R.E. 301.
Foust v. Birds Eye Div. of General Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967), an

employee was injured after her shift in the company parking lot when a coworker backed into her
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with his car. Id. at 418, 616. The Court reasoned that the employee's injury arose out of and in
the course of her employment because it occurred on the employer's premises and there was
nothing to indicate the employee was engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to
her employment. Id. at 419, 617.
Respondent argues that given the holding in Foust, the premises presumption can only be
rebutted by evidence an employee was engaged in abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to the
employee's employment. He calls it the "Foust standard." (Resp. Brief, p. 17). Contrary to
Respondent's assertion, however, Foust does not set forth a required standard of going forward
when rebutting the premises presumption. The Court in Foust discussed how the facts of that
case rebutted the presumption, but did not limit an effective rebuttal to those facts alone. Since
its decision in Foust, the Supreme Court has not recognized Respondent's so-called "Foust
standard" regarding the required standard of going forward, but has instead followed the rule set
forth in I.R.E. 301.

See Kessler, 129 Idaho at 859, 934 P.2d at 32 (stating the premises

presumption would be rebutted by evidence the employee's injury did not arise out of and in the
course of his employment and citing I.R.E. 301).
The Court's holding in Foust is undermined by its subsequent decision in Dinius v.
Loving Care and More, Inc., where it stated that despite the premises presumption, a claimant
still has the burden of showing of a causal connection between the conditions existing on the
employer's premises and the accident involved. Dinius, 133 Idaho at 575, 990 P.2d at 741.
Respondent argues that because his injury occurred on

the Industrial Commission deemed

UPS's premises for purposes of the premises presumption, his injury is compensable and no
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further inquiry is necessary. (Resp. Brief, pp. 18-20). Under this reasoning, an injury that occurs
on the employer's premises is dispositive of the "arising out of' issue, but this is not the required
standard. I.C. § 72-102(18). See Kessler, 129 Idaho at 859, 934 P.2d at 32.
Moreover, Respondent's assertion that Foust created a burden of proof with respect to
rebutting the premises presumption conflicts with the plain language of I.R.E. 301. That rule
provides that despite a presumption, the party against whom it applies does not have the burden
of proof in the sense of non-persuasion. I.R.E. 301. This burden remains with the opposing
party; in our case, Respondent.

To rebut the presumption, UPS only had to introduce

evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the presumed fact (Respondent's
injury arose out of and in the course of his employment) did not exist. As discussed above, UPS
introduced sufficient evidence to permit reasonable minds to conclude Respondent's injury did
not arise out of and in the course of his employment with Employer, and Respondent's assertion
regarding a Foust burden of proof standard is without merit.
Respondent's reliance on 1\fudge v. GNP of Idaho, Inc., 2011 IIC 0083 in support of his
position is equally misplaced because the case does not require a specific standard of proof to
rebut the premises presumption and does not supersede I.R.E. 301. In Mudge, the Industrial
Commission asserted the premises presumption "can be rebutted by proof that the employee,
while on the employer's premises, was engaged in unforeseeable, abnormal activity foreign to
his employment." Id at 5. Notably, the Industrial Commission used the word "can" rather than
"shall." Unlike "shall," the word "can" is not a mandate and thus the Industrial Commission did
not limit the burden of going forward to this specific evidence alone.
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The Industrial

Commission's decision in Mudge is not an appellate decision as provided for in I.R.E. 301 (a) and
therefore does not limit the standard of going forward that is required to rebut the premises
presumption. Accordingly, the Mudge case is not applicable to these proceedings.
Respondent urges the Court to rule as a matter of law that his injury arose out of his
employment because Michael McGuire, Health and Safety Manager at UPS for the Northwest
District, gave "unrefuted testimony" that UPS did not have a formal written policy of its
expectation Respondent tie his shoelaces before beginning his shift.

(Resp. Brief: p. 21 ).

Respondent relies on Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 351, 252 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1953), for the
principle that:
Where there is no dispute in the evidence and it is not reasonably susceptible of
more than one inference, whether or not an accident to a workman arose out of
and in the course of his employment is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of
fact and may be reviewed by this court.

Id. (emphasis added).
In Colson, an employee was injured when his coworker's gun accidentally discharged
and struck him in the leg. Id. at 350-51, 1050. The employee was part of a surveying crew
whose members customarily carried pistols when working away from the central station and
would engage in target practice during their lunch break.

Id. The accident occurred just after

the employee's lunch break expired, when he and a coworker were shooting at an orange. Id.
The employee was required to work on the premises where
the nature of his employment to carry his
1050. It was usual and customary for
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accident happened,

required

and eat it on the work premises. Id. at 351,

crew to carry firearms and engage in target practice

during their lunch break and also during normal work hours, and the foreman knew, condoned,
and participated in target practice with the crew. Id. at 3 52, 1051.
For the reasons discussed below, UPS was not required to have a formal written policy
regarding its expectation Respondent begin his shift with his shoelaces tied.

Additionally,

although Mr. McGuire testified the company did not have an explicit written policy regarding the
matter, UPS specifically told its employees to arrive to work properly suited-up. (McGuire, pp.
26 at 1-8, 37 at 11-19).

While the facts of our case were largely undisputed, they were

reasonably susceptible of more than one inference. The Industrial Commission noted it was a
"close case" because:
[S]hoe tying is such a commonplace occurrence, at first blush it would seem that
such and act could not be related to employment unless changing or selling shoes
was one's occupation. There is no bright line in Idaho case law regarding
when an accident arises out of employment and there are not cases involving
boot tying. More importantly, the scope and reach of the court's decision in
Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., is a subject of legitimate debate.
(R. Vol. I, pp. 51-52) (emphasis added).
Also, in contrast to Colson, Respondent was not required to dress for work at Arnold
Aviation or required to wear lace-up shoes.

There is no evidence his supervisor knew or

condoned Respondent beginning his shift with his shoelaces untied, or that it was customary for
other employees to engage in the same conduct.

It follows that the facts of our case are

distinguishable from Colson, and because UPS was not required to give Respondent notice of its
expectation he begin his shift properly suite-up, it would be improper for the Court to rule as a
matter of law that his injury arose out of his employment.
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Respondent also relies on Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 974 P.2d 78 (1999)
m support of his position, but his reliance on this case is misplaced because it is an
unemployment case and not binding on these proceedings. In Pimley, a woman appealed the
Industrial Commission's decision denying her unemployment benefits.

Id.

The Industrial

Commission found that the woman was discharged for misconduct, and the language Respondent
quoted in his brief explains what qualifies as misconduct under IDAPA 09.01.30.331.03 (1997)
(now found at IDAPA 09.0l.30.275.02(c)).
In order to form the basis for misconduct under this rule, the employee's conduct
must fall below the standard of behavior that the employer had a right to expect,
and the employer's expectations must be objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. The employer's expectations must be communicated to the
employee unless they flow naturally from the employment relationship.
Pimley, 132 Idaho at 435, 974 P.2d at 81 (citing Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092,
695 P.2d 1231 (1984)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the quoted language applies to misconduct under IDAPA 09.01.30.331.03
(1997) and is not relevant to the issue of whether Respondent's injury arouse of his employment
with UPS. Even if the case was relevant to these proceedings, the quoted language includes an
important caveat: an employer's expectations must be communicated to the employee "unless
they flow naturally from the employment relationship." Pimley, 132 Idaho at 435, 974 P.2d at 81
(citing Davis v. Howard 0. Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 695 P.2d 1231 (1984)). The Cowi in
Pimley upheld the Industrial Commission's finding that the employer's expectation its

employees not use vulgar and derogatory language in front

coworkers and customers was

reasonable, and although it was not communicated to the employee explicitly, did not have to be
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because it was the type of expectation that naturally flowed from the employment relationship.
Id. As the Industrial Commission correctly pointed out in this case:
[UPS] has a reasonable expectation that [Respondent] will prepare himself such
that when he arrives at the work site, he is ready to go to work.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 38).
Similar to the finding in Pimley, wearing clothes to work and showing up prepared for the
day flows naturally from the employment relationship, and UPS was under no obligation to
explicitly communicate this to Respondent. Respondent's assertion to the contrary is without
merit.

In fact, Mr. McGuire testified UPS specifically told its employees to arrive to work

properly suited-up.
Q. [Respondent's counsel]
Now, before a small package driver like
[Respondent] begins performing the essential functions of his job, UPS tells
him that he must go through a job set up process to prepare for the work day;
correct?
A. [Mr. McGuire] Uh-huh
Q. Is that a "yes"?
A. Oh, yes. I'm sorry. I know better than that.
Q. Now, doesn't UPS emphasize as part of the job set up process that the UPS
employee know proper preparation for the work day?
A. Yes.
Q. And you specifically tell your employees that if they prepare for the work day
properly, that will minimize or prevent injuries; correct?
A. Yes. We want them to be dressed for the weather. Specifically, in this area,
that we dress in layers so they can control their body temperature,
footwear, sturdy work shoe when they come to
they come to
to
pp. 36 at 23-25, 3 7 at 1-19) (emphasis added).
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Q. [Respondent's counsel] And it would also constitute a violation of the UPS
standard that [a worker] should not have any loose or hanging parts from his
footwear: correct?
A. [Mr. McGuire] As far as the job set, yes. The expectation is [a worker]
would come to work with (his] shoes tied to go to work, yes.
Q. Can you show me any written policy that UPS has that requires the worker to
tie his work boots before he arrives to work?
A. No. Again, that's an expectation, same as when our kids go to grade school
is that their shoes would be tied. We teach them how to [do] that before they
go to grade school, that is an expectation that would not require written
training.
Q. But what if the worker wanted to wear his slippers while he drove to work
and then change into his work boots after he had already punched in as part
of his job set up process?
A. No. That is [not] arriving prepared to work, so he would have to do that prior
to starting work. Not after he starts work. You wouldn't come into the
facility wearing slippers or flip flops or anything like that. The expectation
is you would show up prepared to work.

(McGuire, p. 49 at 2-25) (emphasis added).
Although such preparatory activities flow naturally from the employment relationship,
the Industrial Commission correctly pointed out they are not ordinarily part of the work a worker
is paid to perform and do not bring the worker "in the course of' employment. (R. Vol. I, p. 38).
Respondent has presented no evidence he was required to tie his laces at work rather than at
home or that UPS had knowledge or condoned him suiting-up after his shift began, and his
assertion regarding

McGuire's "unrefuted testimony" is incorrect.

Respondent further argues that the referee correctly applied the "Foust standard" rather
than following the precedent set by Kessler and I.R.E. 301, but the referee's recommendations to
the Industrial Commission carry no weight. (Resp. Brief, p. 15). See I.C. § 72-506(2); Wheaton
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v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 538, 540, 928 P.2d 42, 44 (1996). Rule of Evidence
301 was adopted in 1985, almost twenty years after Foust, and the Court decided Kessler in
1997. I.R.E. 301; Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28 (1997). The Industrial
Commission properly declined to adopt the referee's recommendations regarding the premises
presumption and instead followed I.R.E. 301 and the precedent set by Kessler, which was
appropriate.

The evidence presented is substantial and competent evidence to support the

Industrial Commission's finding that UPS rebutted the premises presumption, particularly
evidence refuting that the risk of injury to which Respondent was exposed to was created by his
employment.
3. The Industrial Commission's application of the quasi-estoppel doctrine was
erroneous.
Respondent and ISIF have failed to present any persuasive arguments in support of the
Industrial Commission's application of the quasi-estoppel doctrine. Both assert UPS had notice
quasi-estoppel would be a litigated issue because ISIF liability and apportionment of permanent
impairment and disability were disputed issues. (Resp. Brief, p. 43; ISIF Brief, p. 17). Such
arguments are flawed because quasi-estoppel is not an element of ISIF liability or a factor to be
considered when determining apportionment, and neither party has presented evidence to the
contrary.
To establish ISIF liability, a party must prove the following elements:
1.
pre-existing impairment;
2.
impairment was manifest;
3. The impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment; and
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4. The impairment combines with the industrial accident m causmg total
disability.
Dumaw v. JL. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d 312, 317 (1990).

Absent from these elements and the statutes related to ISIF liability is a requirement
(express or implied) that the party asserting ISIF liability negate the elements of quasi-estoppel.
Id See I.C. §§ 72-332, -334, -422.

Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that quasi-estoppel is a factor to be considered
when determining apportionment of impairment or disability, or that the party asserting
apportionment must refute the elements of quasi-estoppel. Idaho Code § 72-406 provides for
apportionment of permanent disability. It states that in cases of permanent disability less than
total, if the degree or duration of disability resulting from an industrial injury is increased or
prolonged because of a pre-existing physical impairment, the employer shall be liable only for
the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational disease.

LC. § 72-406.

Although the Idaho Code does not expressly address apportionment of impairment, the AMA
Guides Fifth Edition discusses apportioning impairment as follows:

1.6b Apportionment analysis
Apportionment analysis in workers' compensation represents a distribution or
allocation of causation among
factors that caused or significantly
to
or disease
impairment. The factor
could be preexisting injury, illness, or impairment. In some instances, the
physician may be asked to apportion or distribute a permanent impairment rating
between the impact of the current injury
the prior impairment rating. Before
determining apportionment, the physician needs to
that all of the following
information is true
an individual:
1. There is documentation of a prior factor.
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2. The current permanent impairment is greater as a result of the prior factor
(i.e., prior impairment, prior injury, or illness).
3. There is evidence indicating the prior factor caused or contributed to the
impairment, based on a reasonable probability (> 50% likelihood).
American Med. Ass'n, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 11 (5th ed. 2012)
(2000).
Apportionment of disability and impairment is a question of fact, which will not be
overturned when supported by substantial and competent, although conflicting evidence. See
Quincy v. Quincy, 136 Idaho 1, 4, 27 P.3d 410, 413 (2001). Absent from the statute governing

apportionment of disability and the parameters discussed in the Guides is a requirement that the
party advocating for apportionment prove it has taken consistent positions with respect to a preexisting impairment or otherwise negate the elements of quasi-estoppel.
As previously discussed, quasi-estoppel was not affirmatively pleaded by Respondent or
ISIF, nor was it provided for in the 2012 Notice of Hearing or addressed by the parties at the
outset of hearing. UPS did not address the matter in its post-hearing brief because it was not a
noticed issue or raised by the parties prior to hearing. UPS cannot be said to have impliedly
conceded the issue when it never had notice it was an issue. As an affirmative defense, the
burden was on Respondent and ISIF to raise the doctrine prior to hearing and prove each of the
elements by a preponderance of the evidence; it was not UPS's responsibility to refute them.
Although pre-existing impairment is a required element of ISIF liability, there is no duty upon
the party asserting ISIF is liable to prove it has taken consistent positions in the past regarding
each alleged pre-existing

Likewise,

the proposition that a party advocating for apportionment
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has presented evidence to support
Idaho Code § 72-332 and § 72-

406 must prove prior consistent positions regarding the impairment(s) in dispute.
Given that the Industrial Commission determined Respondent's 1990 injury warranted a
7% impairment rating, it is not unconscionable for UPS to take the same position on the matter.
The evidence supports such a conclusion. It is also not unconscionable for ISIF to be partially
liable for Respondent's total and permanent disability because UPS proved each of the elements
of ISIF liability. When a worker who has a permanent physical impairment incurs a subsequent
disability by an industrial injury, and by reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing
impairment and the subsequent injury or by the aggravation and acceleration of the pre-existing
impairment suffers total and permanent disability,
[T]he employer and surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits
only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational disease, including
scheduled and unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee
shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the
industrial special indemnity account.
LC. § 72-332.

ISIF is required to provide compensation in such cases, and to hold UPS responsible for
disability the Industrial Commission determined was not caused by the subject injury is
unreasonable.

ISIF and Respondent have presented no case law or statute to support their

argument that ISIF liability or apportionment puts a party on notice of quasi-estoppel, and
because UPS did not have notice of the matter, the Industrial Commission's application of the
doctrine was in error.
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4. The Industrial Commission properly apportioned 7% of Respondent's 19%
impairment rating to his 1990 low back injury.

Permanent impairment is "any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after maximal
medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnormality or loss, medically, is considered
stable or progressive at the time of evaluation." LC. § 72-422. Evaluation (rating) of permanent
impairment is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the industrial injury as it affects an
injured worker's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care,
communication, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and non-specialized
activities of bodily members. LC. § 72-424. Permanent impairment must be evaluated after a
person has reached maximum medical improvement. LC. § 72-422. Idaho Code § 72-422 sets
no time limit on when impairment ean be evaluated as long as the person is medically stable
from the condition. See Quincy v. Quincy, 136 Idaho 1, 27 P.3d 410 (2001) (impairment rating
for a pre-existing ankle injury rendered more than 20 years after it occurred).
When apportioning impairment, the AMA Guides are instructive, but not obligatory.
Moncada v. Paula Insurance, 2007 UC 0294. As the finder of fact, the Industrial Commission is

the ultimate evaluator of impairment. Urry v. Walker & Fox A1asonry Contractors, 115 Idaho
75, 75, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). It follows that whether a claimant has impairment is a
factual determination.

Id.

The Supreme Court reviews questions of fact only to determine

whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Bollinger v.
Coast to Coast Total Hardware, 134 Idaho 1,

competent evidence is relevant evidence
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995 P.2d 346, 349 (2000).
a reasonable mind

Substantial and

accept to support a

conclusion. Id.
In this case, the Industrial Commission based its decision to apportion 7% of
Respondent's 19% impairment rating on Dr. Frizzell's testimony, his correspondence letters and
medical reports, and Respondent's medical and employment records, which contradicted his
testimony he was unimpaired prior to his 2009 injury. Dr. Frizzell was a treating physician and
surgeon in this matter, and the only doctor to render an impairment rating for Respondent's 2009
injury. (Frizzell, pp., 6-13). He testified that he apportioned 7% of Respondent's 19% whole
person impairment rating based on Respondent's prior documented lumbar issues, his treatment
of Respondent, and Respondent's statements to him about his prior symptoms, and his 20-year
history of rendering impairment ratings. (Frizzell, pp. 9 at 13-25, 10 at 1, 37-38).
Although the Industrial Commission stated Dr. Frizzell' s original inclination was not to
assign impairment, and that he "vacillated a good deal" in his opinion regarding whether
apportionment was appropriate, his medical reports and correspondence show otherwise. In a
January 2010 letter to Respondent's treating doctor, prior to Respondent's first surgery, Dr.
Frizzell noted that Respondent had been off work two or three times for back problems. (Resp.
2012 Ex. 1, p. 1001).

Following Respondent's second surgery before he reached medical

stability, Dr. Frizzell asserted apportionment was appropriate:
I am aware that [Respondent] had preexisting lumbar spine issues.
that
would
an apportionment of his
is medically stable,
would reflect these

20, p. 224)
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added).

He subsequently affirmed this opinion in a letter to Dr. Harris.
I explained to [Respondent] that part of his impainnent rating would be

apportioned to his preexisting spinal problems.
(Resp. 2012 Ex. 1, p. 1075).
Following medical stability, Respondent's counsel sent Dr. Frizzell a letter asserting that
because Respondent received a 0% PPI rating for his 1990 back injury, "there is no evidence of a
pre-existing impairment directly attributable to his 1990 low back injury that can directly
contribute to his current impainnent rating." (Resp. 2012 Ex. 1, p. 1078). Dr. Frizzell testified
that at the time he responded to the letter, he believed it was required a person have actual
restrictions in place in order to apportion impairment. (Frizzell, p. 39 at 10-16). Consequently,
he changed from his original opinion and opined that although Respondent had previous lumbar
issues in 1990, he was released to full duty without permanent impairment or restrictions, and
"Therefore, there would be no apportionment" of his impairment rating. (Resp. 2012 Ex. 1, p.
1089). When asked about the change in his opinion, Dr. Frizzell re-reviewed Respondent's prior
medical records and asserted 7% of his impairment rating should be apportioned for his preexisting disc herniation.

(App. Ex. 20, pp. 226-27).

Respondent's counsel asked him to

reconsider his opinion on the matter, but Dr. Frizzell affirmed that 7% of Respondent's
impairment should be apportioned to his 1990 low back injury.

(Resp. 2012

1, pp. 1104-

06; App. Ex. 20, pp. 230-31). He stood by his opinion at his post-hearing deposition. (Frizzell,
pp. 39 at 22-25,

at 1).

Frizzell testified
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he considered all the information Respondent's counsel

provided him with respect to apportionment, including the three-step apportionment
methodology utilized in the fifth edition of the AMA Guides, which he followed when
determining Respondent's prior impairment. (Frizzell, pp. 15-16). Because Respondent had a
documented non-operative herniation at L4-5 in 1990, Dr. Frizzell testified that pursuant to the
Guides, a 7% rating was appropriate. (Frizzell, p. 14). Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates

that Dr. Frizzell's decision to apportion impairment is consistent with his original statements on
the matter.
Although Dr. Knoebel opined Respondent was not entitled to impairment for his 1990
injury, his opinion was rendered more than 20 years ago and limited to the information available
to him at the time. Since then, Respondent sustained three additional low back injuries, suffered
from episodic low back symptoms, and was diagnosed with chronic low back pain. Dr. Frizzell
had knowledge of this information when he rendered his impairment rating, and the Industrial
Commission expressly deemed his opinion regarding apportionment credible. (R. Vol. II, p.
295). In contrast, it did not render a finding regarding Dr. Knoebel's credibility, and noted the
record contained only "fragments" of his 1991 report. The Industrial Commission concluded:
The record does not reveal anything about the history upon which he relied, or
[Respondent's] physical findings on exam. The foundation for Dr. Knoebel's
ultimate opinion on the extent and degree of [Respondent's] entitlement to an
impairment rating in 1991 is unclear.
(R. Vol.

295).
Frizzell's opinion is supported by the record and provides substantial and competent

evidence in support of the Industrial Commission's decision to apportion 7% of Respondent's
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impairment to his 1990 injury.
Respondent asserts Dr. Frizzell's opm10n should be rejected because he did not
"specifically follow the 3-step apportionment protocol" set forth in the Fifth edition of the AMA
Guides. (Resp. Brief, p. 35). He cites lvfoncada v. Paula Insurance, 2007 IIC 0294 for the

proposition that the Industrial Commission has historically rejected opinions that do not
apportion impairment in accordance with the Fifth edition of the Guides.

Moncada is

distinguishable from our case in that the opinion the Commission rejected was from a physician
who performed a one-time independent medical examination. Id. at 3. The doctor apportioned
50% of the claimant's impairment rating to her pre-existing spine condition, even though there
was no evidence the claimant had sought medical treatment or missed time from work due to the
condition. Id. at 3, 6. Also, the Commission noted that the Guides are instructive regarding
apportionment, but did not state they were required. Id. at 5.
In our case, Dr. Frizzell performed both of Respondent's surgeries and was exceedingly
familiar with the nature of his low back condition. He testified that Respondent talked with him
about his prior low back problems and that he reviewed records of Respondent's prior low back
treatment, which confirmed an L4-5 herniation in 1990. (Frizzell, pp. 9 at 15-18, 14 at 12-18).
Dr. Frizzell was also aware that Respondent had missed time from work due to his low back pain
on several occasions. Following his first examination of Respondent, he noted "[Respondent]
has had two or three times off work over the years for back problems related to his work."
(Resp.

1, p.

edition

1).
the Guides.
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Frizzell expressly followed the apportionment analysis
20, p. 230). Accordingly, Respondent's assertion

the
Dr.

Frizzell's opinion regarding apportionment should be rejected is without merit and not supported
by the record.
Similarly, ISIF asserts Dr. Frizzell's opinion should be rejected because the Fifth edition
of the Guides requires a showing of range of motion deficits in order to apportion impairment,
which he could not confirm. (ISIF Brief, p. 40). Contrary to this assertion, however, there is no
such requirement, and the Guides in fact give an example of an impairment rating for a lumbar
injury with full range of motion. American Med. Ass'n, supra p. 14, at 384-5, Ex. 15-2. ISIF's
argument there must be a deficit is erroneous.
Respondent's medical and employment records pnor to 2009 further support the
Industrial Commission's decision to apportion impairment because they show he suffered from
episodic low back symptoms and modified the manner in which he performed his work. Also,
there is no dispute Respondent had documented pathology at L4-5 prior to his 2009 injury. CT
and MRI studies following his 1990 low back injury showed a herniation at L4-5. (App. Ex. 2,
pp. 18, 20). A 1999 MRI study showed mild canal stenosis at L4-5 due to a broad diffuse disc
bulge and mild bilateral facet osteoarthritis.

(App. Ex. 21, p. 236).

Industrial Commission

records show that Respondent sustained at least four industrial injuries to his low back prior to
2009, and that just five months prior to his 2009 injury, he reported chronic low back pain to his
primary care doctor.

(App. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2, 5, p. 75). Respondent was able to perform the

essential functions of his job, but his employment records document that he modified the manner
in which he worked.

15). In an evaluation of Respondent's work performance a year

prior to his 2009 injury, the evaluator noted "Excessive backing due to protectiveness of sore
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back."

(App. Ex. 15, p. 124).

Although Respondent discounted the significance of this

observation, the Industrial Commission deemed his statements "unconvincing" when viewed in
combination with his prior medical records documenting his low back pathology and reported
symptoms.
[B]alancing Dr. Frizzell's testimony and reports against the conclusions of Dr.
Knoebel, nevertheless leads the Commission to conclude that Dr. Frizzell credibly
established that [Respondent's] 1990 low back injury entitled him to a 7% PPI
rating. In reaching this conclusion, we are also guided by our finding that
[Respondent] did not credibly testify that his low back was symptom free in
the years prior to the December 18, 2009 accident. The record establishes
that [Respondent] suffered from symptomatic low back complaints prior to
the subject accident, and that these complaints were of such significance to
cause him to self-modify the manner in which he performed his work. These
findings lend credence to the testimony of Dr. Frizzell that [Respondent's]
preinjury low back condition was of such significance as to warrant the award of a
permanent physical impairment rating.
(R. Vol. II, pp. 284, 295-96) (emphasis added).
Respondent and ISIF may disagree with the Industrial Commission's finding, but this is
insufficient to warrant reversal. The above evidence is substantial and competent evidence to
support the Industrial Commission's decision to apportion impairment.
5. The Industrial Commission's finding that Respondent suffered from a manifest preexisting condition which combined with his 2009 injury to render him totally and
permanently disabled is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
the event the Court upholds the Industrial Commission's finding regarding causation,
it should also uphold the Industrial Commission's finding that UPS proved each of the elements
of ISIF liability. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent's pre-existing low back condition
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was a subjective hindrance to employment and combined with his 2009 injury to cause his total
disability. Although Respondent and ISIF argue against apportioning 7% of Respondent's 19%
impairment rating to his 1990 injury, the cause of Respondent's low back condition prior to his
2009 injury is irrelevant for purposes of ISIF liability. The relevant factor is that his impairment
existed at the time of his 2009 injury, which medical records, employment records, and Dr.
Frizzell's medical opinion confirm it did.
The four elements of ISIF liability are outlined in the above section. It is a function of
the Industrial Commission, not the Supreme Court, to determine the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be assigned testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record as a
whole. Earl v. Swift & Co., 93 Idaho 546, 550, 467 P.2d 589, 593 (1970).
Pre-existing Impairment
Idaho Code § 72-332 provides that for purposes of ISIF liability, the pre-existing
impairment can be "from any cause or origin" and must be of such seriousness as to constitute a
hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or re-employment. I.C. § 72-332.
Here, Respondent and ISIF dispute the Industrial Commission's finding that Respondent
had a pre-existing low back impairment. Its finding, however, is supported by substantial and
competent evidence, including Dr. Frizzell's testimony and records, Respondent's medical and
employment records, and Respondent's lack of credibility regarding his pre-injury functioning.
As noted in the above section, Dr. Frizzell's testimony, correspondence letters, and medical
reports directly support
low back impairment.

Industrial Commission's finding that Respondent had a pre-existing
Dr. Frizzell credibly testified that Respondent's 1990 disc herniation
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warranted a 7% impairment rating and 75-pound permanent restriction. Although Respondent
testified he was entirely unimpaired prior to December 18, 2009, his statements conflict with his
prior medical and employment records, which show he sustained at least four industrial low back
injuries prior to 2009, treated for chronic low back symptoms, and modified the way he
performed his job on account of his low back symptoms.

Scott Harris, M.D., who treated

Respondent shortly after his 2009 injury, noted he had a "long history of low back symptoms."
(Resp. 2010 Ex. 2, p. 2003 ). The Industrial Commission considered all of this evidence, as well
as Dr. Knoebel's medical report from 1991, which it properly discounted due to lack of
foundation.

Such evidence is substantial and competent evidence that directly supports the

Industrial Commission's finding.
Manifest
The term "manifest" means that either the employer or employee is aware of the
condition so that the condition can be established as existing prior to the subsequent industrial
injury.

Royce v. Southwest Pipe, 103 Idaho 290, 294, 647 P.2d 746, 750 (1982).

Neither

Respondent nor ISIF dispute the Industrial Commission's finding that all of Respondent's preexisting impairments, including his low back condition, were known to him prior to December
18, 2009. Respondent received medical treatment for each of the listed impairments, and all
resulted from injuries sustained while working for UPS. (App. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2).
Subjective Hindrance
The mere fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent injury shall not
create a presumption that the pre-existing permanent physical impairment was not of such
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seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment. LC. § 72332(2). An injured worker's attitude toward a pre-existing condition is but one factor to be
considered by the Commission in determining whether the pre-existing physical impairment
constituted a subjective hindrance. Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 11 7 Idaho 166, 171-72, 786
P.2d 557, 562-63 (1990). The Commission is required to weigh a wide variety of medical and
nonmedical factors, expert and lay testimony, in making the determination as to whether or not a
pre-existing condition constituted a hindrance of obstacle to employment for the particular
claimant. Id.
Here, although Respondent testified he was entirely unimpaired prior to December 18,
2009, his statements conflict with his prior medical and employment records. Prior to 2009,
Respondent had at least four industrial injuries to his low back. (App. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2). He was
off work for a month in 1999 following a low back injury, and underwent an MRI for low back
pain and bilateral radiculopathy. (App. Ex. 21, p. 236). Respondent gave detailed testimony
about his medical and work history at hearing, but could not recall the 1999 incident or
undergoing an MRI. (2012 Trans., p. 148 at 11-24).

In 2003 and 2005 Respondent again

sustained low back injuries. (App. Ex. 15, p. 97, 1 pp. 1-2). At a Department of Transportation
(DOT) physical five months before his December 2009 injury, Respondent reported symptoms
of chronic low back pain, which he attributed to 28 years of lifting and carrying boxes. (App.
Ex. 5, pp. 75-76). When asked about this record, Respondent explained:
I get muscle pain. I get [a] sore back. You can't

sore.
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that.

back would get

(2012 Trans., p. 162 at 2-5).
Respondent conceded he backed his truck up to buildings to avoid carrying packages, and
his perfonnance reviews from 2000 onward are replete with notations about his frequent
backing; one specifically stated "Excessive backing due to sore back." (2012 Trans., p. 123 at
15-24; App. Ex. 15, pp. 77, 87-88, 101, 110-11, 118-19, 121-22, 124-25, 127).

Respondent

dismissed the reports, claiming his supervisors "have to find something wrong or they are not
doing their job," and were required to record a negative finding, but he received a perfect score
in 1994. (2012 Trans., p. 152 at 16-21; App. Ex. 15, pp. 69-72).

It is also notable that his

performance reviews from 2004 through 2009 consistently document his backing issues in
particular. (App. Ex. 15, pp. 101, 110-11, 118-19, 121-22, 124-24, 127).
Respondent's lack of credibility regarding his prior low back condition was a noted factor
in the Industrial Commission's finding he suffered from a pre-existing impairment.
In reaching this conclusion we are also guided by our finding that [Respondent]
did not credibly testify his low back was symptom free in the years prior to the
December 18, 2009 accident.
(R. Vol. II, p. 295).
Vocational expert Nancy Collins testified that had Dr. Frizzell's 75-pound physical
restriction been in place following Respondent's 1990 injury, it would have precluded him from
returning to his job with UPS and limited his access to the labor market in Valley County
between ten and 15 percent. (2012 Trans. pp. 255 at 4-16). His loss of earning capacity would
more than 50 percent. (2012 Trans. pp. 255-56, 259-61). She noted that
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risk

losing his

high-paying job in a small labor market like Valley County was incentive for Respondent to
return to work without pem1anent restrictions. (2012 Trans., p. 278 at 12-24). Respondent's
vocational expert similarly testified that with Dr. Frizzell's restrictions, he would have
experienced a 15 percent loss of labor market access. (2012 Trans., p. 246 at 1-20).
Dr. Frizzell testified that Respondent's 1990 non-operative disc herniation warranted a
7% rating and permanent physical restrictions of 75 pounds.

(Frizzell, p. 17 at 6-11 ).

He

testified that he normally assigns a 50-pound restriction for disc herniations, but because
Respondent was relatively fit at the time, he could go above medium duty, and a 75-pound
restriction was more appropriate. (Frizzell, p. 17 at 2-11 ).

Dr. Frizzell further stated that the

purpose of such a restriction is to prevent a person from re-injuring himself. (Frizzell, p. 18 at 12). This is parallel to Dr. Collins testimony at hearing; when a person has a documented medical
condition, a physician will give restrictions so the person will not hurt himself further. (2012
Trans., p. 281 at 1-4 ). It is not a sign of physical capacity and does not mean the person is
physically unable to lift at or above the maximum weight limit. (2012 Trans., pp. 280-82). Such
statements are consistent with the Industrial Commission's assertion that the sensibility of Dr.
Frizzell's recommendation for physical restrictions after Respondent's 1990 accident was well
borne out by his subsequent history.
Although [Respondent] returned to unrestricted work following the 1990 low
back injury, he did not stay symptom free. Another low back injury in 1999 took
him off work for a period of weeks. In the years immediately preceding the
subject accident, medical and employment records reflect that [Respondent]
continued to be troubled with symptomatic low back complaints.
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(R. Vol. II, p. 297).
This evidence is substantial and competent evidence to support the Industrial
Commission's finding that Respondent's low back impairment was a subjective hindrance to his
employment.
Combined With
To satisfy the "combined effects" requirement, the party asserting ISIF liability must
show that but for the pre-existing impairments, the worker would not have been totally and
permanently disabled. Eckhart v. State Indus.Special Indem. Fund, 133 Idaho 260, 263, 985
P.2d 685, 688 (1999). Here, medical evidence establishes that Respondent's L4-5 pathology and
symptoms progressively worsened between 1990 and 2009. Following Respondent's low back
injury in 1990, he underwent MRI and CT studies. (App. Ex. 10, p. 28). MRI findings revealed
degeneration and a small focal left paracentral disc herniation at L4-5. (App. Ex. 10, p. 28). At
the time of the studies, Respondent reported he strained his back once or twice per year on
average, and had experienced low back pain for the past three years.

(App. Ex. 10, p. 38). He

also reported radicular symptoms, but his EMG findings were normal and did not warrant
surgical intervention. (App. Ex. 10, p. 40). Respondent experienced industrial re-injuries to his
back in 1999, 2003, 2005, and 2009. (App. Ex. 1, pp.1-2). After his 1999 injury, Respondent
reported low back and bilateral lower extremity radicular symptoms. (App. Ex. 21, p. 236). A
lumbar MRI showed pathology again at L4-5.
Mild canal stenosis at L4-5 due to broad diffuse disk bulge and very mild bilateral
facet osteoarthritis.
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(App. Ex. 21, p. 236). Following his last injury in 2009, Respondent's lumbar MRI reflected that
his disc protrusion at L4-5 had progressed from small to moderate. (App. Ex. 21, p. 24 7).
Moderate size disk protrusion at L4-5 causing moderate central spinal stenosis,
severe left lateral recess stenosis and moderate right lateral recess stenosis. The
other lumbar levels are normal.
(App. Ex. 21, p. 247).
After Respondent's January 2010 surgery, Dr. Frizzell confirmed that Respondent had
aggravated his pre-existing low back condition at L4-5 when he bent over to tie his work boots
on December 18, 2009. (Resp. 2012 Ex. 1, p. 1040). Further, employment records show that in
the years leading up to his 2009 injury, Respondent increasingly backed his vehicle up to
delivery locations to avoid carrying packages. (App. Ex. 15, pp. 101, 110-11, 118-19, 121-22,
124-24, 127).
Respondent and ISIF compare this case to Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., No. 39337
(Idaho filed June 4, 2013) and contend the Industrial Commission "created its own medical
opinion" when it found that Respondent suffered from a pre-existing low back condition and
"exceeded its role as a finder of fact" because there was no medical opinion establishing that
Respondent's 1990 low back injury combined with his 2009 injury to cause total permanent
disability. (Resp. Brief, pp. 41, 43; ISIF Brief: pp. 29, 32). These arguments are without merit
because the Industrial Commission's findings in our case are directly supported by the evidence.
In A1azzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., the Court held that the Industrial Commission is
not entitled to use medical guides not admitted into evidence to assess claimants and formulate
its own opinions regarding a claimant's health. Mazzone, No. 39337, at 11-12. It reached this
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conclusion based on evidence the referee had used her own understanding of the DSM-IV-TR to
formulate a medical opinion and draw conclusions regarding the claimant's proper diagnosis
rather than examine the methodologies utilized by the two physicians who testified on the matter.
Id.

Similarly, the referee made findings about the claimant's medical condition based on his

prescription history when no expert testified about his medications or why they were prescribed.
Id. at 12. Even so, the Court held such errors were harmless. Id. at 12-13.

In our case, the Industrial Commission c01Tectly determined that based on the evidence,
particularly Respondent's medical records and Dr. Frizzell' s medical opinion, UPS had met its
burden. The Industrial Commission did not create its own medical opinion that Respondent's
1990 impairment contributed to his 2009 injury because Dr. Frizzell testified persuasively to this
effect, and the medical records support his conclusion. There is no dispute Respondent suffered
an L4-5 herniation in 1990. Dr. Frizzell is the only medical provider who treated Respondent
following his 2009 injury and provided an opinion regarding the impact of Respondent's prior
low back impairment on his present condition.

Our case is distinguishable from Mazzone

because Dr. Frizzell's opinion and the medical records directly support the Industrial
Commission's conclusions.

Comparisons to A1azzone and the assertion there is no medical

opinion to support the Industrial Commission's finding on this issue is not supported by the
record and without foundation.
Furthermore,
low back impairment or
elements of

was not required to establish the cause of Respondent's pre-existing
that it was due exclusively to his 1990 injury in order to prove the

liability. Respondent's 1
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low back injury was the event that triggered him

to undergo diagnostic studies and which documented his L4-5 herniation, but there was no
burden upon UPS to prove it alone was the cause of his pre-existing low back impairment.
Respondent went on to suffer three other low back injuries at work before the 2009 incident, and
based on statements he made at his 2009 DOT physical, his chronic low back symptoms had
clearly become a concern.

Idaho Code § 72-332 expressly states a permanent physical

impairment can be from any cause or origin. LC. § 72-332(1 ). The evidence demonstrates that
Respondent's pre-existing low back condition was a subjective hindrance to employment and
combined with his 2009 injury to cause his total disability.
Because UPS effectively proved ISIF liability, Idaho Code § 72-332 mandates that ISIF
is responsible for a portion of Respondent's disability. It is not unconscionable for ISIF to share
in the burden because the statute explicitly requires that in such cases,
[T]he employer and surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits
only for the disability caused by the injury ... and the injured employee shall
be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial
special indemnity account.
LC. § 72-332(1) (emphasis added).
The evidence supports the Industrial Commission's finding that Respondent's preexisting low back condition was a subjective hindrance to employment and combined with his
2009 injury to cause his total disability, and therefore, it is appropriate for ISIF to share liability
for his total and permanent disability.
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6. The Industrial Commission correctly held that Respondent should not get a second
chance to litigate his entitlement to medical expenses incurred prior to the 2010
hearing.

Respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his entitlement to medical benefits
and the extent thereof at the 2010 hearing, and the Industrial Commission properly denied his
request to re-litigate the issue. There are five elements of collateral estoppel that bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier
case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the
present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation;
(4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Rodriguez v.
Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 93, 29 P .3d 401, 404 (2001 ).
Here, Respondent's entitlement to medical benefits and the extent thereof was a noticed
issue to be decided at the 2010 hearing. (R. Vol. I, p. 18). It was discussed at the outset of
hearing, and as the Industrial Commission noted in its Order on Reconsideration, was not limited
to only those medical bills Respondent was aware of at the date of hearing; the issue was the
extent of his entitlement to medical benefits.

(R. Vol.

p. 456).

Respondent presented

evidence on the matter and requested a specific prayer for relief; that the Industrial Commission
enter an order holding UPS liable for the
the sum of $149,033.68.

invoiced amount of medical bills he had incurred,

20 0 Brief,

25). The

issue, and ordered UPS to pay Respondent $149,033.68.
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Commission decided the
Vol. I, p. 52).

Although the

Supreme Court did not consider the 2011 Decision final for purposes of an appeal as a matter of
right, it was final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated upon filing the decision in the
office of the Commission. I.C. § 72-718. Respondent did not request to hold open the record so
that the amount of medical bills could be supplemented, nor did he ask the Commission to retain
jurisdiction on the issue.
Respondent has failed to show any sort of manifest injustice as a result of the Industrial
Commission's decision not to re-litigate the issue of his entitlement to medical benefits. (Resp.
Brief, pp. 49-50). Idaho Code § 72-719 permits the Industrial Commission, on its own motion,
to review a case within five years of the date of injury in order to correct manifest injustice. LC.
§ 72-719.

It is not manifest injustice to preclude Respondent from re-litigating an issue

previously argued and decided by the Industrial Commission.

UPS paid Respondent the

$149,033.68 he requested in medical benefits, plus interest, and Respondent's characterization
that UPS received some sort of "credit" is inaccurate.

Likewise, UPS did not avoid its

obligations under Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 14 7 Idaho 146, 206 P .3d 852 (2009)
because it paid Respondent the full invoiced amount of medical bills. If Respondent believed
additional medical bills were outstanding at the time of the 2010 hearing, he could have couched
his prayer for relief differently. His decision to demand a sum certain amount does not justify
reviewing his case and affording him a second opportunity to litigate the issue.
Respondent argues the Industrial Commission's finding should be reversed because
collateral estoppel was not a noticed issue for hearing,

the

was framed by the parties

and the Industrial Commission as included in res judicata, which was an issue listed in the 2012
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Notice of Hearing. Respondent was fully aware of this prior to hearing. Following a 2012 prehearing telephone conference, he noted:
Defendant UPS then asked the Industrial Commission to include the following
issue to be heard and decided at the 5/17112 final Hearing:
Whether the doctrines of Res Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel prevent
the Claimant from requesting that Defendant UPS pay additional past
denied benefits which have not yet been paid by Defendants UPS to the
Claimant?
The Industrial Commission indicated that it would add the issues of Res
Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel to the list of issues to be heard and
decided at the 5/17/12 Hearing.

(R. Vol. II, p. 256) (emphasis added).
Respondent has failed to show that any sort manifest injustice would result from the
Industrial Commission's decision not to re-litigate the extent of his entitlement to medical
benefits, and each of the elements of collateral estoppel is met. For these reasons, the Industrial
Commission's decision on the matter should be upheld.
7. Attorney fees are not warranted.

The Industrial Commission erroneously awarded attorney fees for non-payment of PPI
benefits because Respondent's entitlement to such benefits had not been determined.

The

procedural history of this case and the issues actually litigated is significant to the issue of
attorney fees.
The paiiies litigated the issue of attorney fees at the 2010 hearing and the Industrial
Commission determined UPS did not unreasonably deny the claim.
then sought to appeal the 2011 Decision and Order to the
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I,

51-52).

Court pursuant to

11 (d). (R. Vol. I, pp. 69-71 ). In accordance with Idaho Code § 72-731, the 2011 Decision and
Order were stayed pending the appeal. Section 72-731 states:
An appeal to the Supreme Court shall automatically operate as a supersedeas or
stay of the award, order, or decision being disputed on the appeal unless the
commission shall otherwise order.
I.C. § 72-731.
The Supreme Court subsequently denied UPS's appeal, and when UPS sought
clarification, the Court referred it to Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161
(1992). That case discusses the finality of an Industrial Commission decision and provides that,
"a decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all of the claimant's claims [is
not] a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to IAR 1 l(d) .... " Id at 127, 161. Around this
same time, Respondent demanded UPS pay the benefits awarded in the 2011 Decision as well as
additional benefits not previously awarded. (App. Ex. 16, p. 131 ). UPS responded that there
was a discrepancy between the Supreme Court and the Industrial Commission regarding what
constitutes a final order. (App. Ex. 16, p. 31 ). If the 2011 Decision and Order were not final for
purposes of an appeal, UPS reasonably questioned whether its payment obligations were
triggered. UPS informed Respondent of its intention to request additional issues at the upcoming
hearing to address this matter. (App. Ex. 16, pp. 131-32).

UPS then filed a Motion for Stay

requesting its payment obligations be deferred until the Industrial Commission issued a final
appealable decision. (R. Vol. I, pp. 91-165). Respondent disputed the Motion, and asked
Industrial Commission to award attorney fees for
(R. Vol. II, pp. 17-18).
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's unreasonable

The Industrial Commission denied to stay the proceedings and asserted its 2011 Decision
was final as to the issues litigated, including whether Respondent was entitled to attorney fees.
(R. Vol. II, p. 212).

Absent instruction by the Court following an appeal, the Industrial

Commission stated it would not revisit the issue of attorney fees in future decisions. (R. Vol. II,
p. 208). The Commission acknowledged "this was a close case on the issue of compensability"
and that its decision "could be overturned." (R. Vol. II, p. 207). It further stated:
Defendants have not unreasonably delayed payment of benefits. After the
decision was issued, Defendants filed a notice of appeal and expected the award
to be stayed. Once the appeal was dismissed, Defendants asked the Commission
to consider the question of whether the award should be stayed. This request was
not unreasonable. There were compelling arguments in Defendants' favor.
Ultimately, in light of the policy of the workers' compensation law, and in light of
Defendants' own request to bifurcate the case, we find these arguments
unpersuasive; that does not mean they were frivolous or made in bad faith for the
purpose of unreasonable delay.
(R. Vol. II, p. 212).
UPS requested permission to appeal the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Stay,
which the Commission granted. (R. Vol. II, p. 23 8). It noted there was an apparent conflict
between Idaho Code § 72-718 and I.AR. 11 (d) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jensen v.
Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). The Industrial Commission asserted that
reconciliation

these provisions could have a substantial impact on the case, as well as many

cases before it. (R. Vol. II, p. 238). The Supreme Court denied UPS's permissive appeal request
and ordered the remaining issues be litigated without delay, and
a

issued

for $184, 172.3 8, the amount awarded in the 2011 Decision for medical
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TTD benefits plus interest.
Despite the Industrial Commission's earlier statements, it later awarded Respondent
attorney fees on the issue of PPI and affirmed the award in its Order on Reconsideration. (R.
Vol. II, p. 315; R. Vol. III, p. 460).

The Industrial Commission asserted that following the

Supreme Court's Order Denying Permissive Appeal, UPS should have paid Respondent the
portion of impairment (12%) that Dr. Frizzell opined was related to his 2009 injury.

This,

despite the fact that UPS continued to dispute the issue of causation, and Respondent had not
proven his entitlement to such benefits. Dr. Frizzell's rating was disputed by virtue of the fact
causation was disputed, and UPS had not waived its right to appeal the issue. (R. Vol. II, p.
212).
So long as the Court continues to adhere to the holding in Jensen, the time to file
an appeal as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11 ( d) does not begin to run until after
all the issues before the Commission have been adjudicated. Here, several issues
remain for the Commission to consider. Therefore, Defendants have not waived
their right to appeal.
(R. Vol. II, p. 212).
Moreover, Dr. Frizzell' s opinion about impairment was advisory and not binding on the
Commission. E.g., Baker v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 123 Idaho 799, 801, 853 P.2d 544, 546
(1993).
Respondent's assertion that UPS has mocked the Industrial Commission's exclusive
jurisdiction is incorrect.

has not disputed the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction in these

proceedings and was reasonable in questioning the apparent conflict between Idaho Code § 72718 and

1 l(d) as interpreted by the Court
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Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823

P .2d 161 ( 1992). If a particular matter is adjudicated, and the Industrial Commission issues a
final decision that is filed it in the Industrial Commission office within 20 days, Idaho Code §
72-718 states it "shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated." I.C. § 72-718. The
statute further states that final decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court. LC. § 72-718.
Once the Industrial Commission issues a final decision, Idaho Code § 72-73 5 provides for
enforcement of an award in district court, but only upon a decision where no appeal has been
taken within the time allowed. LC. §72-735(1). Similarly, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 69
discusses execution on a judgment, but requires there be an appealable final judgment. l.R.C.P.
69.
Here, the issue of causation was adjudicated and the Industrial Commission issued a
"final and conclusive" decision on the matter, which it filed in its office within 20 days. (R. Vol.
I, p. 32). The decision was deemed not final for purposes of an appeal, but final for purposes of
triggering UPS's payment obligations.

(R. Vol. I, pp. 74, 76).

Consequently, the parties

remained in the time period allowed to appeal the 2011 Decision to the Supreme Court, and
Respondent could not enforce his award in district court pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-73 5. This
conflict was a reasonable basis for UPS to seek clarification on the matter, and the Industrial
Commission agreed. (R. Vol. II, pp. 237-38). UPS's position on the matter was reasonable, as
was its position regarding payment of PPI benefits prior to the 2012 hearing, and attorney fees
are not warranted. The Industrial Commission's award of attorney fees should be reversed, and
Respondent's

fees should be denied.
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CONCLUSION
The occurrence of an industrial accident and injury was clearly in dispute, and the
Industrial Commission erred in concluding it was a conceded issue.

This error went to the

foundation of the case, and the Industrial Commission's finding that a compensable accident and
injury had occurred should be reversed, rendering all other issues moot. Alternatively, if the
Court affirms the Industrial Commission's award of compensability, the Industrial Commission's
finding that UPS rebutted the premises presumption is supported by substantial and competent
evidence and should be upheld.

Similarly, its decision to apportion 7% Respondent's 2009

impairment rating to his 1990 low back condition and its finding regarding ISIF liability are also
supported by substantial and competent evidence; however, because the Industrial Commission
applied the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to release ISIF of its liability when the doctrine was not
pleaded, noticed, or proven by a preponderance of the evidence, its application of the doctrine
was in error and should be reversed.

Each of the elements of ISIF liability were met, and

therefore, ISIF is partially liable for Respondent's disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332.
Given that UPS reasonably disputed causation and Respondent had not yet proven his
entitlement to impairment benefits, the Industrial Commission's award of attorney fees should be
reversed. No attorney fees are warranted in this case, and UPS respectfully asks the Court to
deny Respondent's request to award them.
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